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LABOR LAW REFORM:
A MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE
ANDREW M. KRAMER *
The labor law reform bills which failed to pass in the last session of Con-
gress did not address the issue of labor law reform in an objective and even-
handed manner. Congress drafted its proposals to expand the Board's arsenal
of weapons and to speed up the Board's representational process with little or
no regard for their impact on important employee and employer rights. The
bills were thus deserving of legislative defeat.
I simply cannot subscribe to Mr. Bredhoff's position that the protections
afforded by the National Labor Relations Act are hollow ones and that
employees have been thwarted in the exercise of their rights under the Act.
In any event, Mr. Bredhoff fails to support his broad, sweeping statements
with any specific proposals for change. Because our national labor laws repre-
sent a delicate balance between the rights of labor and management, talk of
reform must he placed in proper perspective and must therefore focus on
specific legislative proposals to alleviate any real or imagined weaknesses in
the Act.
The issue of labor law reform, as noted by Mr. Bredhoff, is not dead. Art
understanding of the defeated legislation will therefore offer insights into fu-
ture proposals. Mr. Bredhoff and I have chosen to address three issues—
equal access, injunctive relief, and the make-whole remedy—which illustrate
the conflicting views of management. and labor. Through my discussion of
these three areas I hope to highlight the difficulties with the proposed re-
forms and to provide a backdrop for future congressional debates on the
need for labor law reform.
I. EQUAL ACCESS
One of the most controversial provisions of H.R. 8410 and its Senate
counterpart was the proposal that the National Labor Relations Board pro-
mulgate a rule giving union organizers access to an employer's property during
a representation campaign.' While there were some differences in the House
and Senate versions, both bills proceeded on the general notion that if an
employer chooses to address his employees on company property about union
representation, a union should have equal access to the employer's property
to convey its message to employees in an equivalent manner:2 To understand
Copyright © 1978 by Boston College Law School
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' H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 123 CONG. REC. H10632-48 (daily ed.
Oct.. 5. 1977): S. 2467. 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4, 121 Cone:. REC. 57526 (daily ed. May
16, 1978).
2 Section 3 of H.R. 8410 required the Board to promulgate a rule:
(A) which shall, subject to reasonable conditions, including due regard
for the needs of the employer to maintain the continuity of production,
4
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the serious questions posed by the equal access provisions of the labor reform
bills, it is necessary to examine the present law regarding campaigning by
employee and nonemployee union organizers on an employer's property.
The right of employees to communicate in a meaningful and effective
manner has long been recognized as within the ambit of section 7 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. 3 Recognition of this right, however, does not
provide that. if an employer M.
 employer representative addresses the
employees on its premises or during working time on issues relating to
representation by a labor organization during a period of (him that
employees are seeking representation by a labor organization, the
employees shall he assured an equal opportunity to obtain in an equivalent
manner information concerning such issues from such labor organization,
and, with due regard for the rights declared in section 7, the right of such
labor organization to conduct meetings without undue interference, and
the right of the employees to the privacy of their homes, provide also that
the employees are assured an equal opportunity over-all to obtain such
infOrmation from the employer and such labor organization: Provided, the
rule shall apply to elections conducted pursuant to sections 9(c)(1) and 9(e).
H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §
	 123 CoNG. REC. H 10632-48 (daily ed. Oct. 5,
1977).
Section 4 of S. 2467 required the Board to promulgate a rule:
(A) which shall, subject to reasonable conditions, including due regard
for the needs of the employer to maintain the continuity of production,
provide that if an employer or agent of the employer addresses the
employees on its premises or during working time on issues relating to
representation by a labor organization during a period of time that
employees are seeking (i) representation by a labor organization, (ii) to de-
certify or deauthorize a labor organization as their representative defined
in subsection (a) of section 9, or (iii) to rescind an agreement made pur-
suant to the first proviso to subsection (a)(3) of section 8, the employees
shall be assured an equal opportunity to obtain in an equivalent manner
information concerning such issues from such labor organization, and, with
due regard for the rights declared in section 7, the right of such labor
organization to conduct membership meetings without undue interferende,
and the right of the employees to the privacy of their homes, provide also
in the circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), and (iii) that the employees
are assured an equal opportunity overall to obtain such information from
the employer and such labor organization. To obtain an opportunity to
present information relating to representation pursuant to this paragraph,
a labor organization shall notify the employer, in writing, that employees of .
that employer have demonstrated an interest in representation by that
labor organization and from the time of receipt of such notice the labor
organization is to he entitled to an equal opportunity to present such in-
formation in an equivalent manner;
S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2c1 Sess. § 4, 124 CoNG. REC. 57526 (daily ed. May 16, 1978).
Section 7 of the Act provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities For the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except
to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as au-
thorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
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mean that an employer must totally surrender his property rights once a
union organization drive commences. Quite the contrary, both the Board and
the Supreme Court have endeavored to carefully balance and to accommodate
the competing labor and management interests involved. As the Supreme
Court has stated, "[a]ccommodation between [employee-organizational rights
and employer-property rights] must be obtained with as little destruction of
one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other."'
In Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB , 5
 the Supreme Court considered the
extent to which an employer's property rights must yield to permit his own
employees to communicate with each other regarding union representation.
The Court upheld the Board's decision that employees have the right to dis-
tribute campaign material and to solicit support for the union on their
employer's property!' Eleven years after Republic Aviation, the Supreme
Court, in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,' confronted the issue whether
nonemployee union organizers also have the right to distribute union cam-
paign material on an employer's property. Distinguishing between the rights
of employees and nonemployees, the Court held that an employer is entitled
to "post his property against nonemployee distribution of union literature if
.reasonable efforts by the union through other available channels of communi-
cation will enable it to reach the employees with its message... ." 8 Thus, the
Court refused to extend the communication rights granted to employees in
Republic Aviation to nonemployee union organizers.'
4
 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
324 U.S. 793 (1945).
" Id. at 803-04. In Republic Aviation, the Court affirmed the approach previ-
ously adopted by the Board in Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44, 12
L.R.R.M. 183, 183 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009, 14 L.R.R.M. 792 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944).
7
 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
8 Id. at 112.
" Id. at 113. The task of reconciling property and free speech rights was ad-
dressed in a nonlabor context in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). Lloyd
dealt with a ban on the distribution of antiwar handbills in a private shopping mall.
The Court held that a private property owner's prohibition of handbilling is permissi-
ble unless those asserting the right to trespass for communication purposes can show
that no adequate alternative avenues of communication-exist. Id. at 567. The Court
reasoned that:
It would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to require
them to yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under cir-
cu ► stances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist.
Such an accommodation would diminish property rights without signif-
icantly enhancing the asserted right of free speech.
Id. The decision in Lloyd does not turn on whether allowing trespass will promote
more effective communication. Indeed, Lloyd, like Babcock & Wilcox, deemphasized the
effectiveness issue and focused on the availability of alternative means of communica-
tion. See Asociacion de.Trabajadores Agricolas v. Green Giant Co., 518 F.2d 130, 138,
89 L.R.R.M. 2528, 2533 (3d Cir. 1975); Note, First Amendment and the Problem of Access
to Migrant Labor Camps After Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 560,
580-85 (1976).
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The accommodation reached in Babcock & Wilcox between nonemployee
organizational rights and employer property rights has been reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court on several occasions." Most recently, in Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. San Diego District Council of Carpenters," the Court stated:
To gain access [to an employer's property], the union has the burden
of showing that no other reasonable means of communicating its or-
ganizational message to the employees exists or that the employer's
access rules discriminate against union solicitation. That the burden
imposed on the Union is a heavy one is evidenced by the fact that
the balance struck by the Board and the courts under the [Babcock &
Wilcox] accommodation principle has rarely been in favor of trespas-
sory organizational activity."
In two other recent cases, Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB 13 and Beth Israel Hospital . v.
NLRB, 14
 the Court also reaffirmed the accommodation reached in Republic
Aviation between employee organizational rights and employer property
rights.' 5
 Thus, the Sears, Eastex, and Beth Israel decisions clearly illustrate the
Court's differentiation between employee organizational rights and the rights
of nonemployee union organizers. While Eastex and Beth Israel afford expan-
sive scope to employee section 7 communication rights," the Sears decision
indicates that employer property rights take on much greater vitality in the
context of a claim for access by outside organizers."
This judicial protection of employer's property rights from intrusion by
nonemployee union organizers does not mean, however, that unions are pre-
cluded from conveying their message to employees. A myriad of alternative
avenues for communication exist. Employees can solicit union membership
and distribute campaign material on an employer's property." Union offi-
cials, but not management representatives, are allowed to bring their cam-
paign to the homes of employees." Moreover, once an election has been
1 " Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 542-45 (1972); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205
(1978); see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521-22 (1976).
In Central Hardware, the Supreme Court held that union organizers could not gain
access to an employer's parking lot on the ground that the lot had acquired the charac-
" 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
12
 Id. at 205.
'"	 U.S. 98 S. Ct. 2505 (1978).,
4 
	  U.S. , 98 S. Ct. 2463 (1978).
" Easter, 98 S. Ct. at 2516; Beth Israel, 98 S. Ct. at 2469-70.
16 Id.
17 Sears, 436 U.S. at 205.
1 ' Eastex, 98 S. Ct. at 2516; Beth Israel, 98 S. Ct. at 2469-70.
19 Compare Peoria Plastics Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 545, 547-48, 39 L.R.R.M. 1281,
1281-82 (1957) (employer may not call upon employees at their homes to urge them to
reject a union as their representative) with Plant City Welding & Tank Co., 119
N.L.R.B. 131, 133-34, 41 L.R.R.M. 1014, 1015 (1957) (union may call upon employees
at their homes to urge them to support the union).
teristics of a public facility. 407 U.S. at 547.
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ordered by the Board, unions receive the names and addresses of all eligible
voters. 20 It is the very presence of these alternative communication channels
which has caused both the Board and the courts to generally deny non-
employee access for organizational purposes."
Present law thus recognizes the strength of an employer's property rights
in the context of a claim for access by outside organizers. In contrast to the
present law, the labor reform bills proposed that unions be given an expan-
sive right of access once an employer has addressed his employees concerning
union representation. 22 The reform bills' right of access was triggered when
an employer receives written notice that his employees are interested in being
represented by a labor organization. 23 If, after receiving such notice, the
employer talks to his employees about unionization during working time or
on company property, the employer must provide the union with an oppor-
tunity to speak to the employees on company property during company
time. 24 Although the bills did not require a specific showing of employee
interest before the equal access provisions became operative, the Senate
Committee on Human Resources indicated there must first be a showing that
at least ten percent of the employees are interested in unionization, or a
minimum of three employees in small units." The House bill was totally
unclear as to what showing a union had to make in order to secure access
rights.
Under the House and Senate bills, access rights were not confined to
when an employer stops production to make a captive audience speech.
Unions would have had the right to equal access if a supervisor merely dis-
cussed unionization with employees, whether on working or nonworking time.'
2° NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 767 (1969); Excelsior Under-
wear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239-40, 61 L.R.R.M. 1217, 1218 (1966).
21 Access has been granted where employees cannot be reached by union or-
ganizers. E.g., Alaska Barite Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1023, 1029-30, 80 L.R.R.M. 1765,
1765-66 (1970) (remote area): NLRB v. S & H Grossinger's Inc., 372 F.2d 26, 29-30,
64 L.R.R.M. 2295, 2298 (2d Cir. 1967) (resort hotel); NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber
Corp., 167 F.2d 147, 152, 21 L.R.R.M. 2707, 2711 (6th Cir. 1948) (lumber camp). The
heavy burden on securing access is illustrated in NLRB v. Sioux City and New Orleans
Barge Lines, 472 F.2d 753, 82 L.R.R.M. 2488 (8th Cir. 1973). There the court refused
to allow access to the company's barges even though the employees lived in fifteen
different states and mailing had proved unsuccessful. The court held that the union
had not made the "strong showing" that other alternative means of communication
were unavailable during the organizing campaign. Id. at 756, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2491. See
also R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS & K. HURN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT
287-90 (1974); Falk Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 716, 722-23, 77 L.R.R.M. 1916, 1922 (1971);
Monogram Models, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 705, 706-07, 77 L.R.R.M. 1913, 1914-15 (1971).
22 H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3, 123 CONG. Rec. H10632-48 (daily ed.
Oct. 5, 1977) S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4, 124 CONG. Rec. 57526 (daily ed. May
16, 1978). For the complete text of the labor law reform bills' equal access provisions,
see note 2 supra.
22 S. REt'. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1978).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 26.
26 Id. at 25.
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All that was required for access to be granted was the requisite showing of
interest and an employer's exercise of his right to contact his employees con-
cerning unionization. Access was also not confined to any particular number
of labor organizations. Thus, regardless of how many labor organizations are
vying to represent an employer's workforce, under the reform bills they
would have all enjoyed access rights if the showing of interest test was satis-
fied.
Affording access to unions whenever an employer communicates with his
employees about unionization raises serious policy and constitutional ques-
tions. Access will give labor organizations substantial advantages they currently
do not enjoy and will alter the careful balance which the Board and the courts
have endeavored to preserve in the representational area." Before analyzing
the serious questions posed by the equal access provisions, it is instructive to
look at. Congress's reasons for the proposed change. Perhaps the primary
motivation for including an equal access provision in the labor reform bills
was Professors Getman and Goldberg's empirical study of thirty-one NLRB
elections. 28
 While the study showed that. what is said or done in a representa-
tional campaign generally does not affect an employee's vote, the researchers
concluded that unions should have the same opportunities as employers to
hold campaign meetings on working time since an employee's vote might be
affected by greater knowledge of the content of a union's campaign. 2 •
While the drafters of the labor reform bills relied on the Getman and
Goldberg study, they failed to adopt. the authors' recommendation that the
Board cease its regulation of employers' election activity." The proposed
equal access provisions did not alter Board regulation of employers' election
activity and in fact allowed unions access before a representation proceeding
27 See, e.g., NLRB v. United Steelworkers (Nutone, Inc.), 357 U.S. 357, 362-64
(1958): Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429-30, 33 L.R.R.M. 1151, 1152
• (1953); Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 406, 33 L.R.R.M. 1156, 1158 (1953).
See generally Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the
National Labor Relations. Act, 78 HARV. L. Rev. 38 (1964).
1`'
 J. GE"EMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS:
LAW AND REALITY (1976) [hereinafter cited as GETMAN & GOLDBERG]. Legislative re-
liance on the study is indicated in H.R. REP. No. 637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-39
(1977); S. REP. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-25 (1978).
251 GE.TMAN & GOLDBERG, sapra note 28, at 156-57. One of the study's authors,
Professor Stephen Goldberg, testified before both the I-louse and Senate subcommit-
tees on labor. Hearings on H.R. 8410 Belitre the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations
of the House Canon. on Education and Labor. 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367 (1977); Hearings on
S. 1883 &fore the Subcomm. on Labor id the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1945 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1883]. Professor
Goldberg testified that he supported access on the grounds that employees might be-
come more familiar with the issue of unionization and 'night be influenced by such
knowledge. Id. at 1851-52•
(:ErmAN & GoLDBERG, supra note 28, at 159. In his testimony before the
Senate Subcommittee on Labor, Professor Goldberg stated "that the Labor card's
regulation of speech [(hiring a representational campaign] should be terminated and
that the parties should he free to say what they wish during the pre-election cam-
paign. -
 Hearings on S. 1883, supra note 29, at 1852.
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is even pending before the Board." Furthermore, the drafters failed to
adopt the authors' suggestion that unions pay the wages of employees when
access is granted. 32 Thus, while the proposals greatly eased the restrictions
on unions' campaign activity by giving liberal access rights to union organiz-
ers, they subjected employers to the same, or even greater, constraints on
election activity, and thrust the additional burden of providing access upon
them.
The inequity resulting from increasing the freedom of -unions during an
election campaign without also increasing the freedom of employers to engage
in election activity was only one of the serious problems with the proposed
equal access provisions. Another fundamental defect in the proposals was
their oversimplified and inflexible approach. Given the sensitive balance estab-
lished by case law between employers' property rights and employees' section
7 rights, a generalized equal access rule is neither appropriate nor constitu-
tionally permissible." To justify an infringement of employer property
rights, there must be a showing that such infringement is necessary. The as-
sumption on which the defeated legislation was predicated, that unions do not
have adequate alternative avenues of communication, is unsupportable in light
of the - various communication channels protected by the Board and the
courts. 34 Any further encroachment on employers' property rights is un-
necessary and, therefore, unconstitutional.
In Agricultural Labor Relations Board v. Superior Court of Tulare County, 35 the
California Supreme Court, in a four to three decision, upheld an access rule
promulgated by the California Agricultural Labor Relations Board." The
California Board promulgated its access rule on a generalized basis, but lim-
ited access to certain times and places and prohibited certain types of conduct
on a grower's property." Finding that the access regulation was reasonably
"' While section 6 of the Senate bill would in some ways extend employer free
speech protection, it would also allow the Board to closely regulate speech within 48
hours of an election. S. REP. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-28 (1978).
32 GETMAN & GOLDBERG, Siipra note 28, at 158. The study recommended that
while a union should pay the wages of employees if it wants to talk to them during
working hours, overhead costs should be borne by the employer. hi.
'1 " The need for a case-by-case balancing of interests is particularly critical
since the issue of access calls into play a host of hctors which are not capable of
resolution by a generalized or uniform rule-making approach. See Beth Israel Hosp. x'.
N1..1(11, 98 S. Ct. 2463, 2478-80 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
34 Sec tem at notes 18-21 supra.
35 16 Cal. 3d 392, 546 P.2d 687, 128 Cal. Rptr, 183, 91 L.R.R.M. 2657, appeal
dismissed, 429 U.S. 802 (1976).
Id. at 410, 546 P.2d at 698-99, 128 Cal. Rpt.r. at 194-95, 91 L.R.R.M. at
2664.
'" The Calif -Orilla access rule proxides in relevant part:
5. Accordingly, the Board will consider the rights of employees under
Labor Code Sec. 1152 ... to include the right of access by union organii-
ers to the premises of an agricultural employer for the purpose of organiz-
ing, subject to the following limitations:
a. Organizers may enter the property of an employer for a total
period of 60 minutes before the start of work and 60 minutes after the
completion of work• to meet and talk with employees in areas in which
employees congregate before and after working.
November 1978]	 MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE
related to the goal of assisting self-organization and that it was grounded on
the lack of meaningful alternative communication avenues, the Tulare court
held the regulation constitutional. The court stated that,
[On the light of Babcock & Wilcox, it cannot be said that an access
regulation designed to assist self-organization by workers lacks a
reasonable relation to a valid public goal; and a careful examination
of the various limitations as to time, place, purpose, and manner
which are written into this regulation ... demonstrates that it is
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory within the meaning of the
foregoing standards."
Serious problems, as noted by the dissent in Tulare, 39
 are posed by the
majority's construction of Babcock & Wilcox and its progeny. In Babcock & Wil-
cox, the Court established a balancing test to be employed when property
rights are being infringed by an assertion of union organizational rights. 40
This balancing test does not turn on whether a rule permitting access com-
ports with a statutory goal to foster self-organization, but turns on whether
there is a need for access. The satisfaction of this test should therefore de-
pend on whether there are reasonable alternatives to communicate and not on
the assumption that it is more effective to communicate on the employer's
premises.' In any event, the equal access provisions of H.R. 8410 and
S. 2467 were defective even under the analysis used by the majority in Tulare.
None of the factual findings relied upon by the Tulare court are present to
b. In addition, organizers may enter the employer's property for a
total period of one hour during the working day for the purpose of meet-
ing and talking with employees during their lunch period, at such location
or locations as the employees eat their lunch. If there is an established
lunch break, the one-hour period shall include such lunch break. If there
is no established lunch break, the one-hour period may be at any time
during the working day.
c. Access shall be limited to two organizers for each work crew on the
property, provided that if there are more than 30 workers in a crew, there
may be one additional organizer for every 15 additional workers.
d. Upon request, organizers shall identify themselves by name and
labor organization to the employer or his agent. Organizers shall also wear
a badge or other designation of affiliation.
e. The right of access shall not include conduct disruptive of the
employer's property or agricultural operations, including injury to crops or
machinery. Speech by itself shall not he considered disruptive conduct. Dis-
ruptive conduct by particular organizers shall not be grounds for expelling
organizers not engaged in such conduct, nor for preventing future access.
f. Pending further regulation by the Board, this regulation shall not
apply after the results of an election held pursuant to this act have been
certified.
CALIF. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 8, §§ 20900-20901 (1975).
" 16 Cal. 3d at 410, 546 P.2d at 699, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 195, 91 L.R.R.M. at
2664.
39 Id. at 421, 429-31, 546 P.2d at 706, 712-13, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 202, 208-09,
91 L.R.R.M. at 2670, 2674-75.
4° 351 U.S. at 112.
41 Id.
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justify a blanket access rule. Quite the contrary, the findings of the Board and
the federal courts regarding the adequacy of alternative communication
channels contradict the need for such an across-the-board approach.
In addition to the abridgement of employer property rights, the equal
access provisions posed serious first amendment problems. By making an
employer's right to address his employees on matters related to union organi-
zation contingent on his allowing union organizers to enter his property to
solicit support from employees, the proposed equal access provisions in-
fringed an employer's freedom of speech guaranteed in the first amendment.
Employer speech concerning unionization "is firmly established and cannot be
infringed by a union or the Board." 42 in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.," the
Supreme Court noted that the so-called free speech provision of the Act, sec-
tion 8(c),44 "merely implements the First Amendment."'" The equal access
provisions of H.R. 84 10 and S. 2467 required an employer to surrender his
property rights, without a showing that alternative communication channels
are absent, and forced him to financially support a union's proselytizing ef-
forts when conducted on company time. Conditioning an employer's right to
speak on the assumption of such a burden is the type of restriction which has
invoked strict first amendment scrutiny.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo 46 illustrates the Court's aversion to
imposing conditions on the exercise of first amendment rights. In that case,
the Court struck down a Florida statute requiring newspapers to provide
political candidates with free space to reply to any newspaper attack on the
candidate's character. 47 In so doing, the Court found that compelling editors
to publish what they believe should not be published violates the first
amendment's guarantee of a free press." The Court regarded neither the
severity of the restriction on the newspaper nor the burden of complying with
the restriction as a relevant consideration." Indeed, "even if the newspaper
would face no additional costs" by giving candidates room for reply, the Court
would have found a first amendment violation. 5 °
42 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
45
 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
44 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976). Section 8(c) of the Act provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemina-
tion thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the pro-
visions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal
or force or promise of benefit.
45 395 U.S. at 617. Prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), and Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), certain cases suggested that the first amend-
ment does not proted speech motivated by purely financial concerns. E.g., Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942). Virginia State Bd. clearly indicates, however,
that the speech of parties in a labor contest has long been excepted from the now
discredited "commercial speech" doctrine. 425 U.S. at 762.
4"
 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
47 Id. at 258.
" Id. at 256.
4"
 Id. at 258.
50 Id.
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Like the editors in Miami Herald, an employer, under the labor law re-
form bills, would have had to yield some of the control which he is otherwise
entitled to exert over his property and business affairs. Also, like the editors,
an employer would have had to foster points of view which he finds distaste-
ful by surrendering his property to be used as a forum for their publication.
Thus, the proposed equal access provisions unreasonably restricted employers'
free speech rights and, therefore, ran afoul of the first amendment. The first.
amendment problems presented by the equal access provisions were com-
pounded by the requirement that if there was a showing of interest in
more than one labor organization, the employer had to afford access to all of
them." As the number of unions with potential access rights increased, the
likelihood that an employer would communicate his views concerning unioni-
zation on company property would decrease. One half-hour talk by an
employer could trigger equal time for a number of different labor organiza-
tions and an employer's exercise of his free speech rights would become a
very costly activity.
The balance between employees' organizational rights and employers'
property rights is a delicate one and is unsuited to the generalized assump-
tions underlying the reform proposals. Furthermore, as long as the present
alternative channels of communication exist, there is no reason to impose on
employers the burden of providing unions access to their property. Adoption
of a mandatory access rule would distort the balance between the competing
rights of unions and employers which the Board and the courts have en-
deavored carefully to preserve.
II. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The issue whether federal courts should be allowed to enjoin strikes
which violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement has spawned ex-
tensive debate." With the introduction of H.R. 8410 5" and S. 2467 54 this
debate moved into Congress. Both of these legislative proposals, however, ad-
dressed this issue in a less than satisfactory manner. Before detailing the
shortcomings of the injunctive relief provisions of H.R. 8410 and S. 2467, a
51 Sec text at note 26 supra.
" This issue has also been the subject of voluminous commentary. See, e.g.,
Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.I..A. I... REV. 292 (1963); Gould, On
Labor Injunctions, Unions and the Judges: The Boys Markets Case, 1970 SUP. Cr. KEN!. 215;
Keene, The Supreme Court, Section .301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Avco
and Beyond, 15 VILA_ 1.. REv. 32 (1969); Smith, The Supreme Court, Boys !Markets Labor
Injunctions and Sympathy Work Stoppages, 44 U. 011, REV. 321 (1977); Wellington &
Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson,
72 YALE 1547 (1963).
53 H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12, 123 CoNG. REC. H 10710 (daily ed.
Oct. 6, 1977). The full text of the injunctive relief provision ol . H.R. 8410 may be
found at note 74 /Ow.
5-1 S. 2467, 9501 Cong., 2d Sess. § 13, 124 CoNc. REC. S7528 (daily ed. May 16,
1978). The full text of the injunctive relief provision of S. 2467 may he found at note
75 inf-ra.
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brief review of the history behind the availability and utilization of injunctive
relief under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act is in order."
Early in this century federal courts utilized their equity powers to inter-
vene in labor disputes. Intervention typically consisted of the issuance of
orders restraining union activity in broad and ill-defined terms.'" Since the
utilization of injunctive relief impeded employee organizational activity, and
since procedural safeguards for issuing injunctions were few, Congress re-
sponded by enacting the Norris-LaGuardia Act.. 57 Norris-LaGuardia greatly
restricted the federal courts' use of injunctions in labor disputes." The Act
represented "the culmination of a bitter political, social and economic con-
troversy extending over half a century"''" and embodied a philosophy that
labor disputes should be settled between private parties without judicial inter-
ference."
The controversy surrounding Norris-LaGuardia was far removed from
the question of enforcing collective bargaining agreements through injunctive
relief. In fact, at the time Congress enacted Norris-LaGuardia, courts treated
collective bargaining agreements as unenforceable."' It was not until 1947,
when Congress enacted section 301 of the Labor Management. Relations Act., 1 i 2
that federal courts obtained jurisdiction over suits for breach of collective bar-
gaining agreements. Section 301, however, did not. expressly authorize injunc-
tive relief and the question immediately arose whether federal courts could
enjoin violations of collective bargaining agreements in light of the previous
limitations imposed by Norris-LaGuardia.
The resolution of this question turned in part on the separate issue
whether section 301 is merely jurisdictional or whether it gives courts the
power to fashion federal common law with respect to the enforcement of col-
lective bargaining agreements. In Textile. Workers V. Lincoln Mill,n ,"" the Su-
" 29 U.S.C.	 185 (1976). See note 62 ityrti.
" See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, Ti E LABOR INJUNCTION ( 9:i0). •
57 Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (now codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976)).
'" See Note, Accommodation of the Norris-LaGnardia Act to Other Federal Statutes,
72 HARy. I,. key. 354, 356-57 (1958).
" Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prods.. Inc., 311 U.S.
91, 102 (1940).
'' II. WELLING - Fox. LABOR AND THE LECA I. PROCESS 40-41 (1968).
" 1 J. Commoxs & J. ANDREWS, LABOR LECISLATION 1 18 (1920): Rice. Collective
Labor Agreements in American Law, 44 HAIM L. Rev. 572, 572-75 (1931).
62 Ch. 120, title Ill,	 301, 61 Stat.. 156 (now codified at 29 U.S.C.	 185
(1976)). Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor or-
ganization representing employees in an industry al' feeling commerce as
defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations. may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of' the
parties, without respect to the amount. in controversy or without regard to
the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). The legislative history of section 301 is summarized in H.R.
REP. No. 510, 80th C.:ong., 1st Sess. (1947). and abstracted as an appendix to Justice
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
485-546 (1957).
" 3 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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preme Count resolved this issue, holding that section 301 permits the creation
of a substantive body of federal law."' The Lincoln Mills Court went on to
hold that Norris-LaGuardia does not prohibit the specific enforcement of a
contractual duty to arbitrate disputes arising under collective bargaining
agreements."'" 'Ihe Court reasoned that. the enfOrcement of a duty to arbi-
trate is not. "part and parcel of tire abuses against which the [Norris-
LaGuardia] Act was aimed.""" Three years after its decision in Lincoln Mills,
the S111311:file Court again exercised its newly found power to create a body of
federal common law under section 301. In the Steelworkers Trilogy," 1 the Court
established arbitration as "a kingpin of federal labor policy" "s and created a
strong presumption in favor of arbitration. Arbitration became, in the eyes of
the Supreme Court, the primary vehicle to promote industrial peace, and fed-
eral courts were instructed not to thwart the utilization of this process by
narrowly construing grievance and arbitration clauses."
Although the Steelworkers Trilogy established arbitration as an integral part
of the federal common law of labor relations, it did not specify the remedies
available to an employer if a union chooses to ignore the arhitral process and
to engage in a strike over a matter subject to arbitration. Contract damages
unquestionably are available under section 301. 7 " However, since a damage
action may exacerbate relations between an employer and a union, and since
such actions do nothing to immediately end strike activity, the crucial question
became whether injunctive relief is available under section 301 to enforce the
arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining agreement.. Prior to the Steel-
workers Trilogy, the Supreme Court, in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v.
Chicago River & Indiana R.R. Co., 71 had already approved the utilization of
injunctive relief to enforce the arbitration provisions of the Railway Labor
Act." The Chicago River. Court rejected the argument that Norris-LaGuardia
precludes the issuance of injunctive relief when a union strikes over a dispute
subject. to arbitration under the Railway Labor Act. As later noted by the
Court, Chicago River turned on the perception that. the important policy of
Id. at 456-57.
"5
 Id. at 457-59.
Id. at 458.
"7 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960): United
Steelworkers v. Warrior Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp„ 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
Sinclair Relining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 226 (1962) (Brennan, J.,
dissentin g).
' 9 In Warrior & Gulf, the Court stated that.:
An order io arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless
it may he said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not sus-
ceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts
should be resolved in favor of coverage.
363 U.S. at 582-83.
Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery and Confectionary
Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 266 (1962).
'' 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
72 Id. at 40-42.
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settling disputes through a statutorily-mandated arbitration procedure would
be "imperiled if equitable remedies were not available to implement it ... ." 73
Notwithstanding its decision in Chicago River, when the Supreme Court.
considered the availability of injunctive relief under section 301 to enforce the
arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, it prohibited the
issuance of such relief. In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson," the Court held
that Norris-LaGuardia does not allow the issuance of injunctions against
strikes in breach of' collective bargaining agreements, even if the strikes are
over arbitrable grievances. 75 The Sinclair decision was immediately attacked
as undermining the effectiveness of the arbitral process since it failed to en-
sure that labor disputes are channeled through the arbitration procedures
agreed upon by the parties to a collective bargaining agreement."' Moreover,
the Sinclair Court's refusal to accommodate Norris-LaGuardia with section 301
could not be reconciled with the approach adopted earlier in Chicago River.
73 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252 (1970).
74 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
75 Id. at 213-15. Prior to Sinclair, federal courts had concluded that Norris-
LaGuardia did not prohibit the issuance of injunctions to enforce agreements not to
strike. The courts' reasoning is exemplified by Chauffeurs Local 795 v. Yellow Transit
Freight Lines, Inc., 282 F.2d 345, 46 L.R.R.M. 2915 (10th Cir. 1960), rev'd mem., 370
U.S. 711 (1962), where the Tenth Circuit stated:
Surely no one would seriously contend that Section 301 was intended
to open the gates to the abuses of judicial injunctive power which Norris-
LaGuardia was designed to curb. We ought always to be mindful of the
very limited function the courts play in the collective bargaining process.
Yet it seems reasonable to say that if the courts are to exercise jurisdiction
for the redress of violations of collective bargaining agreements according
to notions of federal common law, they are empowered to vouchsafe the
integrity of a bargaining contract to the end that neither party shall be
deprived of the fruits of their bargain.... And this is so, we think,
whether the claimed violation is a refusal to arbitrate according to the
terms of the contract, or the violation of an agreement not to strike or tie
up the employer's business without first resorting to the grievance proce-
dure prescribed in the contract. It is one thing to utilize an injunctive de-
cree for the negative purpose of interfering with full freedom of' associa-
tion, self-organization and designation of representatives to negotiate the
terms and conditions of employment. It is quite another to utilize the judi-
cial processes to preserve and vouchsafe the fruits of a bargain which the
parties have freely arrived at through the exercise of collective bargaining
rights.
Id. at 349-50, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2918 (citation of cases omitted).
7 “ See, e.g., Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered
Questions, 63 CoLum. L. Rev. 1027 (1963); Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301 and
No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Avco and Beyond, 15 VILL. L. REV. 32 (1969);
Report of Special Atkinson-Sinclair Committee, ABA LABOR RELATIONS LAW SECTION
226, 226-44(1963).
In an effort to afford some relief to employers, lower courts held that Sinclair did
no t preclude the enforcement of an arbitrator's award directing a union to cease strik-
ing in violation of a no-strike clause. E.g., New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General
Longshore Workers Local 1418, 389 F.2d 369, 372, 67 L.R.R.M. 2430, 2433 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968).
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Certainly the fact that the arbitration procedures in Chicago River were statu-
tory while in Sinclair they were contractual did not change the already estab-
lished national labor policy of having disputes settled through arbitration.
The appropriate occasion to reconsider Sinclair came in Boys Markets, Inc.
v. Retail Clerks Local 770." Following the approach taken in Chicago River, the
Court accommodated Norris-LaGuardia with section 301 and held that
Norris-LaGuardia does not bar injunctive relief when a union strikes in viola-
tion of a no-strike agreement and when the strike concerns a matter subject to
arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement." At its core, Boys
Marke- ts represented another victory for the arhitral process."
Perhaps the most controversial question after Boys Markets was whether
injunctive relief is available when employees engage in a sympathy strike in
violation of a collectively bargained no-strike clause." This question was re-
solved by a sharply divided court in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers."'
In that case, a group of employees who were members of one union honored
a picket line established by another local of that union. 82
 The employer
77 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
78 Id. at 252-53. justice Brennan. writing for the majority, recognized that
employers would have little, it any, incentive to agree to submit contractual disputes to
arbitration if the courts were unwilling to enlOrce, by way of injunctive relief, the
obligation of unions not to strike over such disputes. Id. at 248. The . holding in Bop
Markets followed Justice Brennan's dissent in Sinclair:
A District Court entertaining an action under 	 301 may not grant
injunctive relief against concerted activity unless arid until it decides that
the case is one in which an injunction would be appropriate despite the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. When a strike is sought to be enjoined because it is
over a grievance which both parties arc contractually bound to arbitrate,
the District Court may issue no injunctive order until it first holds that the
contract does have that effect; and the employer should be ordered to ar-
bitrate, as a condition of his obtaining- an injunction against the strike.
Id. at 259 (quoting Sinclair, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
79 The Boys Markets Court emphasized that the holding in Sinclair "under-
mined the effectiveness of the arbitration technique" and "frustrateld] realization of an
important goal of our national labor policy." 398 U.S. at 252, 241.
8° After Bays Markets, some courts held that the issue whether employees can
honor another union's picket line is an arbitrable dispute and, therefore, Boys Markets
injunctive relief is available. E.g., Valmac Indus., Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519
F.2d 263, 267-68, 89 L.R.R.M. 3073, 3076 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded far
further consideration in light of Buffido Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 906
(1976); NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d 321,
324, 87 L.R.R.M. 2044, 2046 (3d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1(149 (1974);
Monogahela Power Co. v. Local 2332, 1 BEW, 484 F.2d 1209, 1215, 84 L.R.R.M. 2481.
2485 (4th Cir. 1973). Other courts held that sympathy strikes are not over trbitrable
grievances and that injunctive relief is therefore inappropriate. E.g., Plain Dealer Pub-
lishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union No. 53, 520 F.2d 1220, 1221-22, 90
L.R.R.M. 2110, 211(1 (6th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909-10 (1976);
Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372, 1373-74, 81 L.R.R.M.
2644, 2645-46 (5th Cir. 1972). For a full discussion of the sympathy strike cases, see
Smith, supra note 52, at 331-40.
9 ' 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
92 Id. at 400-01.
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claimed that the sympathy strike violated a no-strike clause in its collective
bargaining agreement with the sympathetic union and requested an injunction
to stop the strike. 83 Justice White, writing for the majority, concluded that
injunctive relief was not appropriate and that Boys Markets plainly did not
control 84 since the sympathy strike "had neither the purpose nor the effect of
denying or evading an obligation to arbitrate or of depriving the employer of
his bargain." 85 In the majority's view, to grant injunctions in such cases
would thrust federal courts into the arena of contract interpretation—a role
reserved to arbitrators." Thus, the majority in Buffalo Forge concluded that
the availability of arbitration was a sufficient remedy to the employer.H 7
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting Opinion, attacked the majority's conclusion
that the sympathy strike did not deprive the employer of the benefit of his
bargain." Quite the contrary, Justice Stevens concluded, if the strike violates
the no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement the employer's
agreement to arbitrate is being undermined." Furthermore, the dissent re-
jected (he majority's literal interpretation of Norris-LaGuardia." Justice Ste-
vens reasoned that the concerns which prompted passage of Norris-
LaGuardia were not applicable to a situation where a court was dealing with
the enforceability of a collective bargaining agreement:
Like the decision in Boys Markets, this opinion reflects, on the one
hand, my confidence that experience during the decades since the
Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed has dissipated any legitimate con-
cern about. the impartiality of federal judges in disputes between
labor and management, and on the other, my continued recognition
of the fact that judges have less familiarity and expertise than arbi-
trators and administrators who regularly work in this specialized
area. The decision in Boys Markets' requires an accommodation be-
tween the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act. I would hold only that the terms of that accommodation
do not entirely deprive the federal courts of all power to grant any
relief to an employer, threatened with irreparable injury from a
sympathy strike clearly in violation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, regardless of the equities of his claim for injunctive relief
pending arbitration."'
The views of justice Stevens are well-founded. The question whether
employees can honor a picket line is clearly, as the majority in Buffalo Forge
recognized, a subject for arbitral determination." 2 Requiring an employer to
at. 401 -02.
"4 Id. at 407.
":I
	 at 408.
"" lel. at 411-12.
" Id. at 112.
" Id. at 419 (Stevens, J,, dissenting).
ti9
"'' Id. at 417, 4 92.
" 1 Id at 432.
"2 Id. at 105. Howard Electric Co. v. MEW Local 570, 423 F.2d 164, 166-67,
73 1..R.R.M. 2785, 2786 (0th Cir. 1970); New England Master Textile Engravers
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go first to arbitration while allowing the work stoppage to continue not only
frustrates the arbitral process, but also deprives the employer of the benefit of
his bargain by making virtually meaningless the union's agreement not to
strike. Granting injunctive relief, along the lines suggested in Justice Stevens'
dissent, promotes the very policies which led the Court in Boys Markets to
accommodate Norris-LaGuardia with section 301. 9 "
It is precisely this difference between the majority and the dissent in Buf-
falo Forge over the appropriateness of granting injunctive relief in sympathy
strike situations that spawned the injunctive relief provisions of the labor law
reform bills. H.R. 8410 and S. 2467 took different approaches to the problem
of sympathy strikes. Under H.R. 8410, the Board would have had authority to
seek injunctive relief, when it is in the "public interest," against strikes that.
violate express or implied no-strike clauses and that are not authorized or
ratified by the labor organization representing the striking employees." 4 S.
2467 would have allowed an employer, not the Board, to secure injunctive
relief when his employees, in violation of a no-strike agreement, refuse to
cross a picket line not maintained by a labor organization in connection with a
labor dispute, or engage in a strike which is not authorized, initiated, or
ratified by a labor organization. 95
Guild, 9 Lab. Arb. 199, 201 (1947) (Wallen, Arb.); Amalgamated Lace Operative, 54
Lab. Arb. 140, 144 (1969) (Frey, Arb.).
" See Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 415-24 (Stevens, j., dissenting).
94
 H.R. 8410 would have enabled the Board to seek injunctive relief in the
following situations:
Sec. 12.
(n) Where there exists an agreement between an employer and a labor
organization, whether express or implied, not to strike, picket or lockout.
the Board, if it finds that the public interest would he served thereby, shall
have the power to petition any district court of the United States (including
the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia) within
any district where either or both of the parties reside or transact business,
for such temporary injunctive relief or restraining order as is necessary to
prevent any person not authorized by a representative of employees of the
employer being struck or picketed within the meaning of subsection (a) of
section 9 from engaging in, or inducing or encouraging any employee of
the employer to engage in, conduct in breach of such agreement, irrespec-
tive of the nature of the dispute underlying such strike, picket or lockout,
and such court shall have jurisdiction to grant to such party or the Board
such temporary injunctive relief or restraining order as it deems just and
proper.
H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 12, 123 Corn:. Rec. H 10710 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977).
95 S. 2467 would have enabled employers to secure injunctive relief in the
following situations:
Sec. 13.
" -(f) (1)Where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract between
an employer and a labor organization which is the Tepresentative of
employees under section 9(a) of this Act, the courts of the United States
shall, notwithstanding the limitations stated in the Act entitled "An Act to
amend the Judicial Code and to define and limit the jurisdiction of courts
sitting in equity, and for other purposes", approved March 23, 1932 (29
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Although the injunctive relief provisions of the House and Senate bills
were satisfactory to the extent. they went, they fell far short of granting
employers effective enforcement of a union's agreement. not. to strike (luring
the term of a collective bargaining agreement. Roth bills were drafted to es-
sentially deal with the problem of wildcat strikes and stranger picketing,
rather than the broader issue of enforcing no-strike agreements regardless of
the nature or cause of the dispute."" While it is clear that. the final decision
whether a strike violates a no-strike agreement is for an arbitrator to make, it
is equally clear that an employer needs a preliminary decision and relief front
a court pending an arbitrator's decision. Unless an employer can secure pre-
liminary relief, he is deprived of the benefit of his bargain.
There are at least four reasons for authorizing the courts to give prelimi-
nary injunctive relief for all strikes in violation of no-strike agreements:J'
First., to allow a work stoppage to continue until arbitration is complete ren-
ders meaningless the union's agreement not to strike. An arbitrator's award
generally cannot compensate an employer for the harm inflicted by a strike
which may last weeks pending the arbitrator's decision. Second, early en-
forcement of a union's agreement not to strike promotes the national labor
policy of preserving labor peace."' Third, as Justice Stevens noted in his
dissent. in Buffalo Forge,"" the experience since the passage of Norris-
LaGuardia has dispelled any concern about the impartiality of federal judges
in labor disputes and disproved the notion that judges are less capable than
arbitrators of preliminarily interpreting collective bargaining agreements."
U.S.C. 101 - 115), but subject to the limitations stated herein, have the au-
thority in a civil action brought by that. employer to restrain (A) a con-
certed refusal in breach of that contract to cross a picket line not main-
tained by a labor organization in connection with a labor dispute; or (Ii) a
concerted refusal to work in a breach of that contract (and concerted activ-
ity in furtherance thereof) that is neither initiated, authorized, nor ratified
by the labor organization, where a refusal to cross a picket line maintained
by a labor organization in connection with a labor dispute is not involved,
S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 13, 124 CoNG. RE.C. 57528 (daily ed. May 16, 1978).
The Senate Human Resources Committee Report indicated that employees could also
secure injunctive relief in accordance with existing judicial precedents. S. REP. No.
628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1978). While the Committee Report made this assertion,
the language of S. 2467 was far from clear on this point. Rather, the language
suggested that if a union authorized a strike, regardless of the nature of the dispute,
in junctive relict was unavailable.
124 CoNG. REc. H10709 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Eden-
born); S. REe. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (I 978).
" 7 One bill introduced in Congress this year would have allowed direct en-
forcement of express or implied no-strike clauses, regardless of the nature of" the dis-
pute giving rise to the strike. S. 1983, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Coe.. REC. 513300-06
(1977).
"" 29 U.S.C.	 151 (1976).
"" 428 U.S. 307. 432 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'"'' ld. To protect .the rights of striking unions, federal judges routinely apply
some of the procedural provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, as well as traditional
equitable principles, in section 301 injunctive actions. United States Steel Corp. v.
UMW, 519 F.2(1 1236, 1245-46, 90 1..R.R.NI. 2530, 2544-45 (5th Cir. 1975). cert. denied,
428 U.S. 910 (1976); United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 456 F.2d 483. 487-89, 79
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Finally, many collective bargaining agreements specify that only an employee
may invoke the grievance procedure. Under such an agreement, an employer
may not be able to secure a court. order compelling a striking union to arbi-
trate the issue whether its strike violates a no-strike provision. Hence, unless a
union itself chooses to invoke the grievance procedure—an unlikely event—
an employer may be unable to obtain an arbitrator's decision which he can
subsequently enforce by court-ordered injunction. To ensure that, the avail-
ability of injunctive relief to enforce no-strike clauses is not dependent on
whether the employer can invoke the grievance process,'"' preliminary injunc-
tive relief must be available whenever there is a strike in violation of a no-
strike clause.
In addition to the strong legal arguments, there are practical reasons for
authorizing preliminary injunctive relief for all strikes in violation of no-strike
clauses. Contrary to the Court's assertion in Buffalo Forge, an authorization to
bring such suits will not affect the courts' caseload)" At present, courts
often must. conduct two proceedings when a union strikes in violation of a
no-strike clause: one to compel a reluctant union to invoke the arbitral pro-
cess to determine the applicability of the no-strike clause, and another to en-
force the arbitrator's decision.'" A proceeding to consider a request for pre-
liminary injunctive relief simply would replace the proceeding to compel ar-
bitration since the imposition of an injunction alone would compel most
unions to invoke arbitration.
The effective enforcement of collective bargaining agreements which are
freely struck—including the enforcement of no-strike clauses—should he a
major goal of labor legislation. As I demonstrated above, preliminary injunc-
tive relief for violations of no-strike clauses is essential to ensure that an
employer gets the benefit of his bargain, something which neither H.R. 8410
or S. 2467 accomplished. To ensure that an employer gets the full benefit of
his bargain, future legislative proposals must provide employers preliminary
injunctive relief for all strikes in violation of collective bargaining agreements.
I...R.R.M. 2518, 2520-22 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972); New York Tele-
phone Co. v. Communication Workers, 445 F.2d 39, 49-50, 77 L.R.R.M. 2785, 2792
(2d Cir. 1971).
"" In Boys Markets cases, an employer's right to injunctive relief does not de-
pend on whether he can invoke the grievance procedures. Avco Corp. v: Local 787,
UAW, 459 F.2d 968, 972-73, 80 L.R.R.NI. 2290, 2292-93 (3d Cir. 1972). See Smith, The
Supreme Court, Boys Markets Labor Injunctions and Sympathy Work Stoppages, 44 U. Cm.
L. REV. 321, 349-51 (1977).
102 The majority in Buffalo Forge expressed concern over the number of cases
that would be filed if it granted injunctive relief. 428 U.S. 397, 411 n.12 (1976). While
the Court cited the large number of workers covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments, this figure is not relevant from the standpoint of estimating how many new
cases would arise if the Court had sanctioned injunctive relief" in Buffalo Forge. Id. at
414 n.3 (Stevens, dissenting). For a discussion of other statistics bearing on this
issue, see Smith, The Supreme Court, Buys Markets Labor Injunctions and Sympathy Work
Stoppages, 44 U. Cm. 1... Rix. 321, 348-49 (1977).
"3 See, e.g., Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. 397, 405 (1976).
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III. MAKE-WHOLE RENIEDV
One of the fundamental principles on which the National Labor Relations
Act is based is that of free collective bargaining. 104 The principle of free
collective bargaining requires recognition of the corollary principle that gov-
ernment intervention in the collective bargaining process is prohibited.
Employers and unions should be free "to establish, through collective negotia-
tions, their own charter for the ordering of industrial relations ... ." 1 " The
principle of free collective bargaining led the Supreme Court to conclude in
H.E. Porter Co. v. NLRB t"" that the Board is powerless to impose contractual
provisions or wage increases on employers who unlawfully refuse to bargain
with a union. The Court. held that although the Board can require employers
and employees to bargain, it cannot compel either party to agree to a substan-
tive contractual provision.'" 7
The Board took the principles established in N.K. Porter one step further
in Ex-Cell-0 Corp. 10 " The Board held that despite section 10(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, which directs the Board "to take such affirmative action
... as will effectuate the policies of this [Act]," `" it could not order an
employer to compensate his employees for the financial losses they suffered as
a result of his refusal to bargain.'" The Board concluded that the imposi-
tion of a make-whole remedy was essentially "a form of punishment for [an
employer] having elected to pursue a representation question beyond the
Board and to the courts. - "t Moreover, the Board reasoned that an award of
make-whole relief would require it to speculate as to what the parties would
have agreed upon had they engaged in bargaining, and would thereby cause
the Board to violate the principle established in N.K. Porter against determin-
ing substantive contract terms. 12 The Board thus found itself powerless to
award a make-whole remedy." 3
just prior to the Board's decision in Ex-Cell-0, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held in NLRB v. Tiidee Products,
that a make-whole remedy is appropriate in situations where an employer's
refusal to bargain rests on "patently frivolous"—as opposed to
14 1-1.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970); NLRB v. American
National Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-04 (1952). See generally Wellington, Freedom
of Contract and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 467 (1964).
'''' Local 24, lnel Ithcl. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959).
"" 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
117 Id. at 102.
"'s 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 74 L.R.R.M. 1740 (1970), enforced, 449 F.2c1 1058, 77
L.R.R.M. 2547 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
1 " 29 U.S.C.	 160(c) (1976).
"" 185 N.L.R.B. at 108, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1741.
'" Id. at 109, 74 L.R.R,M. at 1742.
Ill Id. at 109-10, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1743.
Id. at 110, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1743.
'" 426 F.2d 1243, 73 L.R.R.M. 2870 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950
(1970), on remand, 194 N.L.R.B. 1234, 79 L.R.R.M. 1175 (1972), modified and rehearing
denied, 502 F.2d 349, 86 L.R.R.M. 2093 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991
(1975).
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"debatable"—objections to a representation election.'" The Ex-Cell-0 Board,
however, refused to adopt the Tiidee court's distinction between "frivolous"
and "debatable" as a reasoned standard for determining when make-whole
relief is warranted.'"
Labor law reform bills H.R. 8410 and S. 2467 would have altered the
Board's remedial role in the area of collective bargaining by enabling it to
award, in cases where there has been an unlawful refusal to bargain in a first
contract situation, compensation to bargaining unit employees for the delay
caused by the unfair labor practice. 17 The make-whole remedy provisions of
"5 426 F.2d at 1248, 73 L.R.R.M. at 2873.
"" 185 N.L.R.B. at 109, 74 L.R.R.M. at 1742. On petition for review by the
UAW, the District of Columbia Circuit reproached the Board for disregarding the
court's earlier decision in Tiidee. Auto Workers v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1046, 1049, 76
L.R.R.M. 2753, 2755 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The court remanded the case to the Board for
a determination whether the employer's refusal to bargain was caused by a "frivolous"
or a "debatable" objection to certification. Id. at 1050, 76 L.R.R.M. at 2755. However,
before the Board had a chance to decide the case on remand, the District of Columbia
Circuit enforced the Board's previous order on a separate petition for review by the
employer. Ex-Cell-0 Corp. v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1048, 77 L,K.R.M. 2547 (D.C. Cir.
1971). The court of appeals made an independent examination of the record, and
concluded that make-whole relief was inappropriate since the employer's claims were
"fairly debatable." Id. at 1064-65, 77 L.R.R.M. at 2551-52.
07
 The make-whole provision of H.R. 8410 provided:
In a case in which the Board determines that an unlawful refusal to bar-
gain prior to the entry into the first collective-bargaining contract between
the employer and the representative selected or designated by a majority of
the employees in the bargaining unit has`taken place, the Board may
award to the employees in that unit compensation for the delay in bargain-
ing caused by the unfair labor practice which shall be measured by the
difference between (i) the wages and other benefits received by such
employees during the period of' delay, and (ii) the wages and fringe ben-
efits such employees were receiving at the time of the unfair labor practice
multiplied by the percentage change in wages and other benefits stated in
the Bureau of Labor Statistics' average wage and benefit settlements, quar-
terly report of major collective-bargaining settlements, for the quarter in
which the delay began. If the Secretary of Labor certifies to the Board that.
the Bureau has, subsequent to the effective date of the Labor Reform Act
of 1977, instituted regular issuance of a statistical compilation of bargain-
ing settlements which the Secretary determines would better effectuate the
purposes of this subsection than the compilation specified herein, the
Board shall, in administering this subsection, use the compilation certified
by the Secretary.
H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8, 123 CONG. Rec. H 10676-77, H 10702-06 (daily
eds. Oct. 5-6, 1977).
The make-whole provision of S. 2467 provided:
(3)(A) In a case in which the Board determines that an unlawful re-
fusal to bargain prior to the entry into the first collective-bargaining con-
tract between the employer and the representative selected or designated
by a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit has taken place, the
Board may enter an order pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection
which includes an award to the employees in that unit of compensation for
the delay in bargaining caused by the unfair labor practice in an amount
equal to the difference per hour during the period of delay between
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the 1-louse and Senate bills proceeded on the notion that the Board's remedial
authority is not effective in refusal to bargain cases.'" Critics of the present
legislative scheme have argued that an employer can evade his legal obligation
to bargain in good faith with little or no risk and, therefore, that a compen-
satory remedy is necessary.'"
The make-whole provisions of H.R. 8410 and S. 2467 were seriously
flawed. One problem raised by the bills was that they ignored the distinction
recognized by the 'rider coon between a refusal to bargain to secure judicial
review of an NLRB decision and a refusal to bargain for illicit ui frivolous
reasons."" The hills failed to specify the types of conduct which warranted
make-whole relief."' At best, this lack of guidance would have forced the
Board to speculate as to the legitimacy of an employer's reason for refusing to
bargain. At worst, it would have permitted the Board to impose make-whole
relief' even where an employer's motives were justifiable. As a result of the
bills' failure to provide guidelines for the imposition of make-whole relief,
employers with legitimate claims would have been discouraged from refusing
to bargain in order to secure judicial review of a Board decision. The problem
is particularly acute because a refusal to hargain is the only method by which
an employer can challenge an NLRB representation decision. 122
There were also a number of practical problems with the make-whole
remedy proposals. One problem was that the House and Senate bills deter-
mined the make-whole remedy by reference to the Bureau of Labor Statistics'
average wage and benefit settlements index.'" This index covers only wage
(i) the wages and other benefits such employees were receiving at the time
of the unfair labor practice increased by a percentage equal to the change
in wages ;111(1 other benefits stated in the Bureau of Labor Statistics' aver-
age wage and benefits settlements, quarterly report 1)1' major collective-
bargaining settlements, for the quarter in which the delay began and
(ii) the wages and other benefits actually received by such employees dur-
ing that period. If' the Secretary of Labor certifies to the Board that the
Bureau has, subsequent to the effective date of the Labor Law Reform Act.
of 1978. instituted regular issuance of a statistical compilation of bargain-
ing settlements which the Secretary determines would better effectuate the
purposes of this subsection than the compilation specified herein, the
Board shall, in administering this subsection, use the compilation certified
by the Secretary.
S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 	 9, 124 Co•c. REC. 57527 (daily ed. May 16, 1978).
1 " See H.R. REP. No. 637, 95th Ging,. 1st Sess. 39-42 (1977). See generally
Schlossberg & Silard, The Need For a Comperimilory Remedy in lieln.sal-to-Bargwin Cowes, 14
‘VAYNE 1,. REV. 1059 (1968); Note, An Aroes.onent of the Proposed -Make-Whole - Remedy in
Refits-al to Bargain Cates, 67 Mica. I.. REV. 374 (1968).
See, e.g., Morris. The Role of the NLRB and the Coatis in the Collective Bargain-
ing Process: A Fresh Look of Conventional Wisdom and Unconventional Remedies. .'SO V AND.
I., Rev, 661, 677-83 (1977).
12" See t ext at notes 114-16 supra.
121
 See note 117 supra.
'" See Boire Y. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 478-79 (1964).
"" See note 117 Slipla, The Bureau of Labor Statistics' (BLS) report used in
calculating the make-whole remedies in S, 2467 and H.R. 8410 was developed in 1966.
BLS measures the effect of collective bargaining decisions on hourly labor costs based
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and benefit settlements for bargaining units containing over five thousand
employees.'" Since most Board bargaining units contain fewer than sixt.y
employees,'"' I-1.R. 8410 and S. 2467 would have imposed on an employer a
make-whole remedy which probably has no relevance to his particular bar-
gaining situation."" Moreover, the make-whole award would set the floor for
wage demands in the next round of bargaining even though it. might be more
than the employer would agree to otherwise and more than he could af-
ford.' 2 '
The difficulties associated with a standardized wage index illustrate a
more fundamental problem with the make-whole relief proposals: bargaining
agreements cannot he cast in a generalized mold. Bargaining agreements re-
flect a myriad of circumstances and conditions which vary from negotiation to
negotiation. In first contract situations, the agreement often reflects trading in
such non-economic areas as seniority, grievance handling and arbitration,
union security, and dues checkoff, and in such economic areas as pensions,
holidays, vacations, shift differentials, and cost of living increases. The vice of
make-whole remedies is that they either require the Board to speculate post
hoc on what wage and benefit package would have been agreed upon, or, as in
H.R. 8410 and S. 2467, impose a standardized wage which is irrelevant to the
situation at hand.
Remedies, short of make-whole relief, can be imposed on employers who
flaunt their obligation to bargain in good faith. For example, the Board can
order recalcitrant employers to pay a union's attorney's fees, litigation ex-
penses, and bargaining expenses.'" Federal courts can also use their con-
tempt powers for willful and repeated violations of Board orders.' 2"
 Alterna-
tively, Congress could provide for direct. review of Board representation deci-
on certain assumptions aucl estimates. Factors which may limit the preciseness of the
estilruues are forecasts of employee response to contract changes; assumptions
amortization of liberalized pensiOn benefits for prior service; and estimates in the cost
of changes in vacation and other benefit provisions based on workers' length of serv-
ice. For a discussion of how 111,8 estimates settlement costs. see David and Sheifer,
Estimating the Cost 	 Collective Bargaining Settlements, 92 N 1 ()NTH iv LAB. REV. 16 (June,
1969),
124
 S. REp, No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1978).
125
 So! 42 NLRB ANN. REP. ifi -i-(17 (1977).
121' Senator Byrd recognized this problem and introduced a substitute bill to
correct. it See 124 Cox:. RE.c. 58814-18 (daily ed. June 8, 1978). This bill utilized the
Bureau of Labor Statistics' employment cost index (ECI) for occupations covered by
collective bargaining agreements. The ECI is based on a sample of collective bargain-
ing agreements in units of all sizes and is weighted to reflect the proportionate
number of units in which collective bargaining occurs by size.
127 See Now, An Assessment of the Proposed "Make-I4 1,We- Remedy in Refmcal-to-
Bargain Cases, 67 Mien. I.. REV. :174. 388-89 (1968); The Supreme Cowl, 1969 Term—
NLRB Remedial Power to Impose Contract Terms, 84 II A R V. L. REV. 202, 210- 11 (1970).
1 ' See generally Nforris, The Role of the NLRB and the Courts in the Collective Bar-
gaining Process: A Fresh Look at Conventional IVistlom and Unconventional Remedies, 30
VANu. 1.. REV. 661, 678-87 (1977).
12 " See NLRB v. J,I). Stevens & Co., 56:.1 F.2d 8, 25, 96	 2150, 2162 (2d
Cir. 1977). cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1978).
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sions, thereby eliminating the problem of employers refusing to bargain to
obtain judicial review. Congress also could authorize the Board to impose
fines on employers and unions who repeatedly evade their bargaining obliga-
tions.
The National Labor Relations Procedures and Remedies Act 12° contained
another, although wholly unsatisfactory, alternative to make-whole relief. The
Chairman of the Senate Human Resources Committee introduced the legisla-
tion after it. became apparent that S. 2467 was doomed. Under this proposal,
the Board would have been authorized to seek a district court injunction if
there is reasonable cause to believe that an employer or a union is refusing to
bargain prior to execution of its first collective bargaining agreement."' This
alternative proposal was defective primarily because it, like the make-whole
remedy proposal, drew no distinction between employers who refuse to bar-
gain for illicit reasons and those who refuse to bargain to obtain judicial re-
view of Board representation decisions. Under the alternative proposal,
employers might have had to argue their objections to a representation deci-
sion in two tribunals—the district court in defense to the action for an injunc-
tion, and the court of appeals in defense to an unfair labor practice charge. A
district court order to bargain would certainly have rendered hollow a later
appellate court decision setting aside a union certification. Furthermore, by
giving district courts the authority to order an employer to bargain over a
particular subject, the alternative proposal would have thrust the courts directly
into the bargaining arena. Hence, both the injunctive relief proposal of the
Procedures and Remedies Act and the make-whole relief provisions of H.R.
8410 and S. 2467 intruded impermissibly on the collective bargaining process
and thereby violated one of the fundamental principles on which the National
Labor Relations Act is based—free collective bargaining.
CONCLUSION
The recent congressional efforts at labor reform were totally unsatisfac-
tory from a management perspective. It is evident that the suggested reforms
stemmed from a narrow congressional bias in favor of the interests of labor.
If the proposals had passed, they would have dislocated the careful balance be-
tween the rights of labor and those of management which our national labor
laws have attempted thus far to preserve. I am not implying by my criticism
of the recent efforts at reform that Congress should forego all labor law revi-
sion. Future pursuit of reform, however, must entail more than recitation of
alleged management abuses and the proposal of a series of major changes
responsive primarily to labor's interests.
I began this article with the hope that it would highlight some of the
problems that exist with selected provisions of the recent labor reform pro-
posals. I end this article with the hope that Congress, too, will examine criti-
cally all future labor reform proposals and ensure that the proposals it adopts
protect the important rights of both labor and management.
l" 1.1978] DAILY LAS. REP. (BNA) E-1 (Sept. 25, 1978).
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